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Cambodia
Katheryn M. Klein*
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

The time for justice is running out. Over thirty years have passed since the Khmer
Rouge took over Cambodia’s capital, Phnom Penh, and overthrew the Khmer Repub lic in
order to carry out their violent plan to transform Cambodia into an agrarian, communist
society. 1 From April 1975 until January 1979, the Khmer Rouge subjected citizens to
forced labor, torture and genocide. 2 Two to three million Cambodians were forced to
evacuate their urban homes and ordered into slave labor in the countryside. 3 By the close
of 1979, nearly one- fifth of the Cambodian population had been decimated by the Khmer
Rouge. 4
The Khmer Rouge leaders are responsible for the deaths of 1.7 million5 of their
own countrymen and to the present day have not been held accountable. 6 The debate
over the appropriate mechanism by which to try the Khmer Rouge leaders for their
crimes was so protracted that members of the Khmer Rouge have been aging and some
dying; leaving victims and their families without hope of bringing the Khmer Rouge
leaders to justice. 7 Pol Pot, the highest ranking Khmer Rouge leader known as “Brother
*

Katheryn M. Klein, J.D. Candidate 2006, Northwestern University School of Law; B.A. in Political
Science and B.A. in History, University of California at Los Angeles (2002).
1
Rachel S. Taylor, Better Late Than Never, in INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW
SERIES, A CCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 237, 238-39 (Jane
E. Stromseth ed., Transnational Publishers 2003).
2
Identical letters dated 15 March 1999 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General
Assembly and the President of the Security Council, 53rd Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. A/53/850
at 2 (1999).
3
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 239.
4
The Report of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 52/135,
53rd Sess., Agenda Item 110(b), U.N. Doc. A/53/850, at 5 (1999). [hereinafter GROUP OF EXPERTS
REPORT ].
5
Cf. id., at 13. This source notes: “Scholars and Governments have offered differing totals for the
number of Cambodians killed by the Khmer Rouge. Scholars have separately arrived at figures of 1.5
million and nearly 1.7 million. There was a sharp disparity among victim groups. One study posits close to
a 100 per cent death rate for rural and urban ethnic Vietnamese, 25 per cent for urban and rural Khmer
“new people”, and 15 per cent for rural Khmer ‘base people.’ Overall, the various estimates point to a death
rate of approximately 20 per cent of the April 1975 population of 7.3 to 7.9 million people. Historians of
Cambodia have rejected the figure of 2 to 3 million that has often been used by the Governments in
Cambodia since 1979, as well as in some popular accounts.”
6
Scott Luftglass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nation’s Responsibility to Withdraw
Involvement from the Establishment of a Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L.
REV. 893, 895 (2004).
7
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 237-38.
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Number One,” died in 1998 and four years later Ke Pauk, another former Khmer Rouge
leader, also died. 8 Both men died with their freedom, never having to face accountability
for their brutal crimes.
On May 13, 2003, after years of negotiations regarding the judicial mechanism
through which the Khmer Rouge should be brought to justice, the United Nations and
Cambodian Government approved the “Draft Agreement between the United Nations and
the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution of Crimes Committed
during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea” (March Agreement). 9 The March
Agreement consists of thirty-two articles and establishes the special chambers within the
Cambodian court structure to prosecute former members of the Khmer Rouge. 10 The
tribunal, which will follow Cambodian law and utilize a combination of Cambodian and
international judges, 11 represents a new and untested approach to the prosecution of war
crimes. 12 In contrast to the completely international tribunals established in Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, the Khmer Rouge tribunal combines a minority of international judges and
a majority of Cambodian judges to form a joint tribunal located in Cambodia. 13 Article 3
of the March Agreement establishes that the Trial Chambers shall be composed of three
Cambodian judges and two international judges, while the Supreme Court Chamber,
which will serve as the appellate chamber and chamber of final instance, shall consist of
four Cambodian judges and three international judges. 14
The establishment of the joint tribunal as the accountability mechanism for trying
former members of the Khmer Rouge is controversial, largely due to concerns that its
structure is flawed and is, therefore, unlikely to effectively administer justice. 15 The
features of the tribunal, which present risks to its success, include: (1) lack of judicial
independence due to interference by political manipulation of the Cambodian
government, 16 (2) no independent, international prosecutor, 17 (3) the limited number of
competent Cambodian judges 18 and (4) a flawed supermajority formula. 19 On March 31,
2003, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed concern over these risks
in his report to the General Assembly on the March Agreement. 20
8

Id.
Draft Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kapuchea, U.N. GAOR 3D Comm.,
57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 109(b), U.N. Doc. A/57/806 (2003) [hereinafter M ARCH A GREEMENT ].
10
Id.
11
Id. at Arts. 3, 12. Article 12 further states that “Where Cambodia law does not deal with a particular
matter, or where there is uncertainty regarding the application of a relevant rule of Cambodian law, or
where there is a question regarding the consistency of such rule with international standards, guidance may
also be sought in procedural rules established at the international level.”
12
Gerald V. May III, An Unlikely Culprit: Examining the U.N.’s Counterproductive Role in the
Negotiations Over a Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 27 B.C. INT ’L & COMP . L. REV. 147, 149 (2004).
13
Id. at 150.
14
M ARCH A GREEMENT , supra note 9, at Art. 3.
15
Human Rights Watch, Serious Flaw: Why the U.N. General Assembly Should require Changes to the
Draft Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/cambodia043003-bck.pdf
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, Serious Flaw].
16
Id. at 3-4.
17
Id. at 4-5.
18
LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 897.
19
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, Serious Flaw, supra note 15, at 5-6.
20
Id. at 1-2.
9
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I cannot but recall the reports of my Special Representative for human
rights in Cambodia, who has consistently found there to be little respect on
the part of Cambodian courts for the most elementary features of the right
to a fair trial. I consequently remain concerned that these important
provisions of the draft agreement might not be fully respected by the
Extraordinary Cha mbers and that established standards of international
justice, fairness and due process might therefore not be ensured.
Furthermore in view of the clear finding of the General Assembly in
resolution 57/225 that there are continued problems related to the rule of
law and the functioning of the judiciary in Cambodia resulting in
interference by the executive and with the independence of the judiciary, I
would very much have preferred that the draft agreement provide for both
of the Extraordinary Chambers to be composed of a majority of
international judges . . . . 21

¶5

The Security Council approved the March Agreement over the objections of the
Secretariat and Kofi Annan. 22 Each of the concerns mentioned by Secretary-General
Annan indicate that the structure of the joint tribunal, as devised in the March Agreement,
may be flawed and collectively could result in the failure to provide justice for the
victims of the Khmer Rouge.
This Note will argue that the March Agreement fails to address the formidable risks
involved in the establishment of a joint tribunal in Cambodia. The Cambodian
government still exercises control over the Cambodian judiciary and the presence of a
majority of Cambodian judges likely will cause the tribunal to lack credibility in the eyes
of Cambodians and the international community. 23 Furthermore, the presence of
international judges may prove to be an illusory safeguard, if they are unaware of
governmental interference with the Cambodian judges. Part II of this Note will provide
historical background on Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime and specifically
focus on the misguided utopian philosophies of the Khmer Rouge and the human rights
violations they committed in an effort to achieve their goals. Part III will trace the
history of negotiations between Cambodia and the United Nations regarding the
establishment of the joint tribunal and illustrate the lack of good faith exercised by the
Cambodian government, which greatly prolonged the process. Part IV will address the
structure of the tribunal and analyze the risks facing the joint tribunal. In closing, Part V
contains a case study of the Special Court established in Sierra Leone and asserts that a
Cambodian tribunal modeled after the Special Court may achieve several of the goals of
the joint tribunal with substantially fewer risks.

21

Report of the Secretary General on Khmer Rouge Trials, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 109(b), at 11, U.N.
Doc. A/57/769 (2003).
22
Press release, United Nations, General Assembly Approves Draft Agreement Between UN, Cambodia
on Khmer Rouge Trials, GA/10135 (May 13, 2003).
23
HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, Serious Flaw, supra note 15, at 1.
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II. HISTORICAL O VERVIEW
¶6

April 17, 1975 signified the end of a decade- long struggle for power in Cambodia
and the beginning of one of the worst human rights tragedies of the twentieth century. 24
On that day, the Communist Party of the Kampuchea or Khmer Rouge took over
Cambodia’s capital, Phnom Penh, and overthrew the hereditary monarch, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk, who ruled the Kingdom of Cambodia from independence in 1953
until 1970. 25 The events leading up to the fall of Phnom Penh weakened Cambodia’s
political structure paving the way for the Khmer Rouge takeover. Despite Sihanouk’s
efforts to marginalize the Khmer Rouge, support from Vietnamese Communist leaders
enabled the Khmer Rouge to persist as a powerful political force. 26 Exactly one month
before April 17, 1975, Prime Minister Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik Matak,
Sihanouk’s cousin, overthrew Prince Sihanouk in a bloodless coup, while Sihanouk was
visiting the Soviet Union and China. 27 Prime Minister Lon Nol and Prince Sisowath Sirik
Matak established the Khmer Republic, which was supported by the United States. 28 The
allegiance between the Khmer Republic and the United States during the Vietnam War
further fueled the fires of the Khmer Rouge. 29 The Khmer Rouge also had the support of
North Vietnam and China. 30 Ironically, after being overthrown, Sihanouk established an
opposition government and allied with the Khmer Rouge, the very group he had
attempted to marginalize during his monarchy. 31 North Vietnam and China’s support of
the Khmer Rouge, coupled with the withdrawal of United States assistance in 1975,
enabled the Khmer Rouge to secure power easily. 32
A. The Philosophy of the Khmer Rouge: The Push for Self-Reliance

¶7

The misguided, utopian philosophies of the Khmer Rouge focused on the creation
of a pure Khmer nation, “one completely sovereign and self- reliant, free from subjugation
by foreign and class enemies.”33 The Khmer Rouge ideology has its roots in Marxism
with the vision of creating a dictatorship of the proletariat. 34 The Khmer Rouge was, in
large part, motivated by the fear that countries surrounding Cambodia, in particular
Vietnam, were threatening to take over Cambodia. 35 In its quest for self-reliance, the
Khmer Rouge sought to bring Cambodia to what it labeled “Year Zero,” through the

24

JASON S. A BRAMS, STEVEN RATNER, A CCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW : BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 267, (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2001);
SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL : A MERICA AND THE A GE OF GENOCIDE 87 (Basic Books 2002);
Yale University, Cambodian Genocide Program, Introduction, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/cgpintro.html (last
visited January 20, 2006).
25
A BRAMS & RATNER, supra note 24, at 267.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
A BRAMS & RATNER, supra note 24, at 267.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT , supra note 4 at 8; A BRAMS & RATNER, supra note 24, at 267.
33
A BRAMS & RATNER, supra note 24, at 267.
34
Id.
35
Id.
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creation of an agrarian utopia lacking any traces of modernity. 36 The regime launched a
revolution in which “all pre-existing economic, social and cultural institutions were
abolished, all foreign influences were expunged and the entire population was
transformed into a collective work force.”37 The Khmer Rouge set out to kill anyone who
could possibly thwart its goal of creating a new society, including those among its own
ranks whom were viewed as potential dissidents. 38 It perceived “intellectuals” such as
doctors, teachers, lawyers, students and those capable of speaking a foreign language as
particularly threatening. 39 The Khmer Rouge was also highly suspicious of former
members of the Khmer Republic as well as religious figures and ethnic minorities. 40 The
Khmer Rouge’s push toward a self-reliant system, driven by fear and paranoia,
“eradicated money and markets, did away with private property, abolished formal
education, shut hospitals, took children away from their parents, forced cultural
minorities to abandon their customs, and destroyed organized religion.”41
B. Implementation of the Khmer Rouge Vision of Society through Fear and Cruelty
¶8

¶9

The first major step towards achieving this agrarian utopia involved the massive
reorganization of the Cambodian population in 1978. 42 The Khmer Rouge divided the
country into zones that were each further divided into sectors to effectively exert control
over the population. 43 The Cambodian people were organized into agricultural
cooperatives in the countryside that were supervised by committees appointed by the
Khmer Rouge. 44 Phnom Penh served as the administrative center, through which the
Khmer Rouge gave orders to regional and local officials. 45
The Khmer Rouge efficiently implemented its plan to concentrate the population,
forcing between two and three million people to evacuate the cities and march into the
countryside within a week of overthrowing the Khmer Republic. 46 The merciless
marches were indiscriminate and included the young, the elderly and the sick. Witnesses
report horrifying images of patients in Phnom Penh hospitals being dragged from their
beds and made to march, many dying en route. 47 Numerous people, who were healthy
before the march, died during the journe y, due to starvation, dehydration, disease and

36

M AY, supra note 12, at 149.
GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT , supra note 4 at 9.
38
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 239; See Theresa Klosterman, The Feasibility and Propriety of a Truth
Commission in Cambodia: Too Little? Too Late? 15 A RIZ. J. INT ’L & COMP . LAW 803, 849 (1998).
39
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 239.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 240.
42
GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT , supra note 4, at 9.
43
Id. By 1978, there were seven zones, which were further divided into 32 sectors. The sectors were
then broken down into sub-districts and cooperatives.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
37
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lack of medicine. 48 Corpses rotted in the streets and disease was rampant. 49 Phnom Penh,
once a busy capital, was transformed into an eerie ghost town of twenty thousand. 50
¶10
The survivors of these marches were placed into communal labor teams and kept
on grueling schedules in the rice fields, often being made to work seven days a week
under the supervision of the Khmer Rouge overseers. 51 The unending labor was
particularly traumatic for city dwellers unfamiliar with working in the fields. 52 Anyone
who was too weak to work or refused to work was murdered, often within the presence of
family members. 53
¶11
After four torturous years, countless human rights violations and the deaths of
nearly one- fifth of the population, the Khmer Rouge was finally deposed when
Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in 1979. 54 The Vietnamese replaced the Khmer
Rouge with the People’s Republic of Kampuchea, ironically composed of some former
Khmer Rouge members who had defected to Vietnam. 55 Hun Sen, a former Khmer
Rouge soldier who was installed as the party’s Foreign Minister, is currently the Prime
Minster of Cambodia. 56 Hun Sen has proved to be uncooperative in the negotiations
regarding the establishment of the joint tribunal, most likely in an effort to shield himself
and his Khmer Rouge cadres from prosecution. 57
III. THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND CAMBODIA
¶12

Hun Sen’s vehement opposition to an international tribunal coupled with his status
as a former member of the Khmer Rouge casts a questionable light on his sincerity with
regard to bringing the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge to justice. Hun Sen’s
comments that the Khmer Rouge were murderers lacks some effect due to the fact that he
only defected as a soldier of the party whe n one of the many purges of the Khmer Rouge
began to focus on his own ranks. 58 Additionally, there is evidence that Hun Sen’s
requests for international assistance with establishing a tribunal may have been strategic
ploys to divert attention from the bloody military coup he staged in 1997 to overthrow the
then First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh. 59 Hun Sen’s motives, which appear to
lack good faith, combined with his power as the Prime Minister and ability to interfere in
the future trials, casts considerable doubt as to the appropriateness of a joint tribunal.
¶13
On June 21, 1997 former First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh and then
Second Prime Minister Hun Sen wrote a letter to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan requesting the

48

Id.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
A BRAMS & RATNER, supra note 24, at 267.
53
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 240.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Philip Shenon, UN Plans Joint War Crimes Tribunal for Khmer Rouge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1999,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/camb odia/99-08-12.htm.
59
Seth Mydans, Cambodia Purge Said to Claim 40 Victims, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1997, at A8.
49
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assistance of the United Nations and international community in bringing
to justice those persons responsible for the genocide and/or crimes against
humanity during the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975-1979 . . . .
....
. . . We are aware of similar efforts to respond to the genocide and crimes
against humanity in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and ask that
similar assistance be given to Cambodia. Cambodia does not have the
resources or expertise to conduct this very important procedure
We believe that crimes of this magnitude are of concern to all persons in
the world, as they greatly diminish respect for the most basic human right,
the right to life. We hope that the United Nations and the international
community can assist the Cambodian people in establishing the truth about
this period and bringing those responsible to justice. Only in this way can
this tragedy be brought to a full and final conclusion . . . . 60
The letter appeared to be a promising invitation to create an international tribunal
sponsored by the United Nations. 61 The specific request for assistance similar to that
provided by the United Nations in establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
were particularly misleading. 62 Cambodia’s request did not reflect its true intentions, as it
never intended to acquiesce to a predominantly international tribunal. 63 Furthermore,
Hun Sen’s motive for requesting assistance was also highly questionable. On July 5,
1997, Hun Sen overthrew Norodom Ranariddh and took power with a bloody military
coup, killing more than forty political opponents. 64 The timing of Hun Sen’s pursuit for
international prosecution of the Khmer Rouge evokes suspicion that his motives were
disinge nuous. Hun Sen was extremely concerned with gaining international credibility
and may have advocated international prosecution as a means of garnering credibility and
diverting attention from the coup. 65
¶14
In response to Ranariddh and Sen’s letter, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted a December 12, 1997 resolution entitled “Situation of Human Rights in
Cambodia.”66 This resolution was significant as it represented the United Nations’
commitment to assisting the Cambodian government with the Khmer Rouge trials and
gave the mandate to a United Nations group of experts to investigate possible means of

60

See Letter from Norodom Ranariddh, Cambodian First Prime Minister, and Hun Sen, Cambodian
Second Prime Minister, to Secretary General Annan (June 21, 1997) [hereinafter LETTER FROM NORODOM
RANARIDDH AND HUN SEN].
61
LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 906.
62
See LETTER FROM NORODOM RANARIDDH AND HUN SEN, supra note 60.
63
LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 906.
64
Id. at 907.
65
LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 907.
66
Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, G.A. Res. 52/135, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., 70th plen.mtg.,
Agenda Item 112(b), P 16, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/135 (1998).
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holding the Khmer Rouge accountable. 67 Paragraph 15 of the resolution acknowledges
that
the most serious human rights violations in recent history have been
committed by the Khmer Rouge and that their crimes, including the taking
and killing of hostages, have continued to the present, and notes with
concern that no Khmer Rouge leader has been brought to account for his
crimes. 68
Paragraph 16 of the resolution requests
the Secretary-General to examine the request by the Cambodian
authorities for assistance in responding to past serious violations of
Cambodian and international law, including the possibility of the
appointment, by the Secretary-General, of a group of experts to evaluate
the existing evidence and propose further measures, as a means of
bringing about national reconciliation, strengthening democracy and
addressing the issue of individual accountability. 69
Pursuant to paragraph 16 of resolution 52/135, Secretary-General Kofi Annan established
a “Group of Experts” with three main goals: “(1) to evaluate the existing evidence and
determine the nature of the crimes committed; (2) to assess the feasibility of bringing
Khmer Rouge leaders to justice; and (3) to explore options for trials before international
or domestic courts.”70 The United Nations Group of Experts (the Experts) traveled
through Cambodia from July 1998 until February 1999, interviewing government and
non-governmental officials, current Cambodian citizens and some survivors of the Khmer
Rouge regime. 71 The Experts concluded that the Khmer Rouge had committed, inter alia,
the international crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 72 Despite
the difficulty with finding surviving witnesses, who could recall the events of over twenty
years past and the problem of decaying physical evidence, the Experts found ample
evidence to proceed with the prosecution of Khmer Rouge leaders. 73
¶15
The Experts focused the bulk of their report on analyzing the various options for
bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice. 74 In total, the Experts examined five tribunal
options including: (1) a tribunal established under Cambodian Law, (2) a United Nations
tribunal, (3) a Cambodian tribunal under United Nations administration (through a
bilateral agreement between the United Nations and Cambodia), (4) an international
tribunal established by multilateral treaty and (5) trials in states other than Cambodia. 75
67

GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT , supra note 4, at 5-8.
G.A. RES. 52/135, supra note 66, at para.15.
69
Id. at para. 16.
70
Steven R. Ratner, The United Nations Group of Experts for Cambodia, 93 A M. J. INT ’L L. 948, 949
(1999).
71
Id.
72
GROUP OF EXPERTS REPORT , supra note 4, at 16.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
68

556

Vol. 4:3]

Katheryn M. Klein

The Experts cautioned that “the precarious state of the Cambodian domestic judicial
system, the risk of political influence on the domestic courts, and the contentious
international law issues involved,” indicate that the “establishment of an ad hoc United
Nations tribunal seated in an Asia-Pacific nation-state other than Cambodia” would be
the most prudent tribunal option. 76 The Experts also recommended an independent
prosecutor, appointed by the United Nations, and even suggested that the Prosecutor from
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International Tribunal
for Rwanda assume this role. 77 In contrast to his request for United Nations assistance
with the prosecutions, Hun Sen’s government dismissed the Experts’ conclusions and
refused to consider a predominately international tribunal as a viable option. 78
¶16
The United Nations devised a proposal for a tribunal with a majority of foreign
personnel, hoping that the Cambodian government would accept the concept of a joint
tribunal. The joint tribunal as proposed by United Nations Special Representative for
Human Rights in Cambodia, Thomas Hammarberg, would contain a majority of
international judges and an international prosecutor. Hun Sen rejected this proposal and
the United Nations responded with a second proposal. 79 Under the second proposal the
tribunal was to have one trial chamber and one appeals chamber to prosecute genocide
and crimes against humanity. 80 This proposal struck a balance in that Cambodian
personnel would be active participants in the trial alongside a majority of international
personnel and the tribunal would function under the jurisdiction of Cambodian law with
implementing legislation, before commencement of the trials. 81 Provided that they were
appropriately qualified, the Cambodians would be able to nominate their own candidates
for personnel positions and all tribunal personnel, international and domestic, would be
appointed by the Secretary-General. 82 Hun Sen’s government rejected this second
proposal.
¶17
After Cambodia rejected the second proposal, the United States entered into the
negotiations. 83 In October 1999, the Cambodian government endorsed the United States’
proposal for a joint tribunal, however this agreement fell apart when the Cambodian
government rejected it and replaced it with its own proposal for a domestic tribunal that
would allow limited participation by foreign judges. 84 The Cambodian proposal was for a
joint tribunal, but one that was fundamentally national in character. 85 The tribunal would
have one trial chamber and two appeals chambers, with a majority of Cambodian
personnel. 86 Another problematic aspect of the proposal is that it included a new
definition of genocide, which violated the international law against retroactivity. This
proposal serves as a prime example of the Cambodian go vernment’s refusal to comply
76

LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 909.
Id.; Craig Etcheson, International Law Weekend Proceedings: Accountability Beckons During a Year
of Worries for the Khmer Rouge Leadership, 6 ILSA J. INT ’L & COMP . L. 507, 510 (2000).
78
LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 909.
79
Id. at 910
80
ETCHESON, supra note 77, at 511.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 911.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id at 911-12.
77
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with United Nations’ requests that Cambodia compromise on basic issues of international
law. 87
¶18
In an effort to avoid halting the negotiations, the United States and Cambodia
agreed on a Draft Memorandum of Understanding, which included a modern definition of
genocide and a domestic tribunal with co-prosecutors and “supermajority” requirements.
Under this proposal, the tribunal would have three Cambodian and two international
judges on the trial level and four Cambodian and three international judges on the appeals
level. However, the agreement of at least one international judge would be required for
all decisions. 88 Cambodia did not sign the Memorandum of Understanding and insisted
that the tribunal would not be established, unless both parties signed the document. 89
Although there appeared to be some progress, Cambodia then took a counterproductive
and rash unilateral action without any regard for the international community, creating
yet another delay in the negotiations process. “On August 10, 2001, the Cambodian
government passed legislation approving Hun Sen’s legally unsound proposal for a joint
tribunal by a Cambodian National Assembly vote of 86-2 and Senate vote of 51-0.”90
Shortly thereafter, on February 8, 2002, the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations
Secretariat officially ended negotiations with Cambodia. 91
¶19
The impasse continued until June 2002 when Hun Sen finally wrote the SecretaryGeneral requesting United Nations assistance. 92 On December 18, 2002, the United
Nations General Assembly passed resolution 57/228 requesting that Secretary-General
Annan renew talks with Cambodia. 93 The United Nations effectively endorsed the
creation of the controversial joint tribunal with a majority of Cambodian judges. 94 The
resolution made a series of recommendations to the United Nations negotiating team. 95
First, the resolution directed that the Extraordinary Chambers have subject
matter jurisdiction consistent with the Law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and personal
jurisdiction over the former leaders of the Khmer Rouge. Second, the
resolution called for the exercise of this jurisdiction in accordance with
international standards of justice, fairness and due process of law, as set
out in articles 14 and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and

87

Id. at 912.
See Tribunal Memorandum of Understanding Between the United Nations and the Royal Government
of Cambodia, PHNOM PENH POST , Issue 9/22, Oct. 27 – Nov. 9, 2000, available at
http://www.yale.edu/cgp/mou_v3.htm; See also The Secretary-General, Press Release, Secretary-General
Clarifies Position on Cambodian Government Responsibility for Trials of Former Khmer Rouge Leaders,
U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7868 (June 27, 2001).
89
Daniel Kemper Donovan, Recent Development: Joint U.N. – Cambodia Efforts to Establish a Khmer
Rouge Tribunal, 44 HARV. INT ’L L.J. 551, 564 (2003).
90
Mann Buyanunda, The Khmer Rouge on Trial: Whither the Defense?, 74 S. CAL. L. RE V. 1581, 1619
(2001).
91
Id.
92
LUFTGLASS, supra note 6, at 911.
93
G.A. Res. 57/228, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/228 (2002).
94
G.A. Res. 57/228, supra note 93; LUFTGLASS , supra note 6, at 914-15.
95
G.A. Res. 57/228, supra note 93; LUFTGLASS , supra note 6, at 914-15.
88
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Political Rights. Third, the resolution called for the independence and
impartiality of judges and prosecutors . . . . 96
¶20

After Hans Corell, the United Nations legal counsel, met with Cambodian officials
in Phnom Penh on March 17, 2003, he announced that they had reached a draft
agreement 97 with Cambodia on the status of a court. 98 It took five years and eleven
rounds of negotiations before Om Yentieng, an advisor to Prime Minister Hun Sen,
stated, “We have agreed on a draft cooperation agreement in which the United Nations
will assist Cambodia in the proceedings of a special tribunal.”99 On May 13, 2003, a
consensus of the United Nations General Assembly approved the March Agreement,
which was officially adopted by the Cambodian National Assembly in October 2004. 100
¶21
Though the March Agreement may appear to signify progress towards bringing the
Khmer Rouge to justice, it could turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory. Hun Sen’s refusal to
accept any suggestions for an international tribunal, despite his specific call for United
Nations assistance, indicates that he may be acting in bad faith and for his own selfinterest. For instance, Hun Sen’s assurances to the Cambodian public that low-ranking
members of the Khmer Rouge will not be subject to trial may be prompted by the fact
that as a former Khmer Rouge soldier Hun Sen fears that if all officials of the Khmer
Rouge are subject to trial, he may be called before the court. 101 Regardless, the fact that
Hun Sen, who has a significant conflict of interest, is capable of dictating who will be
called before the court clearly defies the basis of impartiality that is a cornerstone of the
judiciary. 102 Furthermore, the structure of the March Agreement fails to safeguard against
potential interference of the Cambodian government or to address the concerns regarding
a lack of judicial independence and the limited number of competent Cambodian
judges. 103
IV. THE MARCH AGREEMENT : THE STRUCTURE OF THE JOINT TRIBUNAL LEAVES THE
TRIALS VULNERABLE TO POLITICAL I NTERFERENCE
¶22

The March Agreement’s ambitious attempt to employ Cambodian and international
judges in the Extraordinary Chambers in the courts of Cambodia is an untested and
highly risky approach to war crimes prosecution. 104 In contrast to the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda ad hoc tribunals, which had the neutrality of a strictly international tribunal, the
joint tribunal mixes foreign judicial participation with the domestic judicial establishment
in a manner that lacks the safeguards of a strictly international tribunal. 105 Specifically,
the structure of the joint tribunal, as delineated by the March Agreement, places too
96
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heavy a burden on Cambodia’s underdeveloped judicial system and relinquishes too
much power to the Cambodian government, which suffers from a history of systematic
corruption.
A. The Lack of Competent Judges and Their Vulnerability to Manipulation
¶23

The tribunal’s lack of a majority of international judges could lead to unjust trials,
as a result of governmental manipulation of Cambodian judges. The composition of
judges is established in Article 3 of the March Agreement, which stipulates that there will
be three Cambodian judges and two international judges in the Trial Chamber and four
Cambodian judges and three international judges in the Supreme Court Chamber. 106 A
fair and just executive as well as an independent judiciary are essential to the integrity of
a joint tribunal. 107 Cambodia’s political structure is characterized by a corrupt executive
with a long history of interfering with its weak judicial system, which suffers from a
dearth of competent judges. 108 The Cambodian Government itself has acknowledged
these problems in the reports it has filed as a party to the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 109 In its report on compliance with the ICCPR,
Cambodia states, “The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by law. However,
practice has shown that, owing to interference and pressure from other branches, the
courts are not fully independent.”110 The government further noted that
Given that the Supreme Council of Justice has not yet been established,
the trial courts, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court do not yet
function well, because of the lack of competent staff and docume nts
available for consultation. Some judges are obliged to seek the opinion of
the Ministry of Justice on the interpretation of articles and the
determination of offenses; the Minister of Justice makes recommendations
and issues guidelines to enable the judges to apply laws and procedures
correctly. Such actions might weaken the independence of the judiciary to
some extent, but under the present circumstances, in which judges are not
sufficiently experienced, they need guidance in order to perform their
work. 111

¶24

Judges in Cambodia have little to no physical security or professional
independence. 112 High political officials instruct Cambodian judges to rule a certain way
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on cases and threaten their safety if they do not rule as instructed. 113 Since 1993, physical
attacks on courts have occurred frequently and in April of 2003, a prominent judge was
assassinated in the middle of the day as he drove to work in Phnom Penh. 114 In highly
politicized cases, it is not uncommon for the executive to negotiate prearranged pardons
to demonstrate its power over the judiciary. 115
¶25
In addition to the judiciary’s susceptibility to political influence, there is also the
logistical challenge of finding Cambodian judges who have experience in international
law, international humanitaria n law and international human rights. During the Khmer
Rouge Rule, the court system was completely abandoned and numerous members of the
judiciary were killed in an attempt to create a classless, homogenous society. 116 The
Khmer Rouge viewed lawyers and judges as intellectuals capable of threatening their
rule. 117 Some legal professionals were fortunate enough merely to be stripped of their
positions, while those less fortunate were systematically murdered. 118 Even today,
Cambodian society suffers from a deficit of qualified and competent personnel to staff
the judiciary. 119
¶26
The lack of confidence among the Cambodian citizenry in the abilities of judges
and lawyers is yet another critical factor that may undermine the Khmer Rouge trials. In
a study funded by the Cambodian Genocide Project at Yale University, every single
person out of twenty five survivors of the Khmer Rouge regime stated that a trial could
not be held in Cambodia because the judiciary is too weak and corrupt. 120
B. No Independent, International Prosecutor
¶27

The Cambodian government’s insistence upon hiring one international and one
Cambodian prosecutor, instead of just one independent, international prosecutor, subjects
the trials to yet another avenue of political interference. 121 The prosecutor is responsible
for conducting pre- indictment investigations, analyzing evidence and interviewing
potential witness. 122 It is essential that all of these tasks are carried out by an objective
and independent prosecutor and, given Cambodia’s track record, it seems unlikely that
the Cambodian prosecutor will be able to act independently. 123 In the past, prosecutors in
Cambodia have had to seek approval from politicians before determining who to indict.
Furthermore, the presence of the Cambodian prosecutor can be used to delay the trials. 124
Article 7 of the March Agreement provides for the use of a special panel when the
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Cambodian and international prosecutor disagree. 125 The special panel is to consist of
three judges selected by Cambodia’s Supreme Council of Magistracy and two by the
Secretary-General and decisions are made by reaching a supermajority. 126 Each
prosecutor or investigating judge has to submit a written statement giving the reasons for
their differing opinions. 127 Thus, the Cambodian government can bring the trials to a
slow crawl by instructing the Cambodian members of the tribunal to challenge all of the
decisions of the international prosecutors and investigating judges. 128
C. Cambodia’s Poor Track Record in Adhering to International Standards of Justice
¶28

In addition to Hun Sen’s lack of cooperation and his effort to stall progression
towards the establishment of the tribunal, the illegitimate “show” trials of Pol Pot and
Ieng Sary provide more direct evidence of the long-standing lack of respect for the
standards of justice in Cambodia. 129 In 1979, the Vietnamese- installed regime established
a tribunal and claimed to try the Khmer Rouge for their crimes. 130 The proceedings
however, were at best an attempt to appease Cambodians and the international
community and at worst a deceptive plan to gloss over the massive human rights
violations and allow numerous former Khmer Rouge members to remain
unaccountable. 131 The trials focused only on Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge’s Prime Minister,
and Ieng Sary, the regime’s Deputy Prime Minister, holding them responsible for all
crimes of the Khmer Rouge. 132 Despite the trials conference of blame of all Khmer
Rouge atrocities on these two men, they remained unpunished. 133 Neither Pol Pot, nor
Ieng Sary were at the trials and they were sentenced to death in absentia. There was no
effort made to capture these men, both of whom were supposedly hiding at the time. 134
¶29
These trials lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the international community for
several reasons. 135 “First, the two leaders were tried in absentia, a violation of the
[ICCPR].”136 Article 14(d) states that all people have the right “[t]o be tried in his
presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing.”137 “Second, the Decree Law establishing the ‘People’s Revolutionary
Tribunal’ contained language denouncing the two defendants, functionally assuming their
guilt, a violation of the international norm of the ‘presumption of innocence.’138 Third,
the definition of genocide used at the trial did not comport with the internationally
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accepted definition.”139 The Decree Law defined genocide to include “planned massacres
of groups of innocent people; expulsion of inhabitants of cities and villages in order to
concentrate them and force them to do hard labor in conditions leading to their physical
and mental destruction; wiping out religion; destroying political, cultural and social
structures and family and social relations.”140 This law, which deviates from the
internationally accepted definition of genocide in the Convention on the Punishment of
and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) was created to ensure
the guilt of the defendants. 141 The Genocide Convention defines genocide as
acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious groups as such: (a) Killing members of the
group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group. 142
¶30

The Cambodian government’s blatant disregard for the prevailing standards of
international law in its establishment of the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal raises
significant concerns regarding whether it will comply with international law during the
Khmer Rouge trials held by the joint tribunal.
D. The Supermajority Formula of the Tribunal is Flawed.

¶31

The Cambodian Government’s refusal to clarify the supermajority formula with the
United Nations may be motivated by the desire to keep the decision- making process
ambiguous in an effort to exert control over the outcomes of the trials. The
unprecedented supermajority formula, which is codified in Article 4 of the March
Agreement, is fraught with ambiguities that could render the trials completely
ineffective. 143 The United States was an ardent supporter of an international tribunal and
it devised the supermajority formula as a compromise to appease Hun Sen. 144 The
supermajority offers some protection from political interference by requiring that if
decisions are not made unanimously, “a decision by the Trial Chamber shall require the
affirmative vote of at least four judges [and a] decision by the Supreme Court Chamber
shall require the affirmative vote of at least five judges.”145 However, there is a
potentially dangerous flaw in the supermajority provision of the March Agreement
regarding the process for reaching a verdict. 146 The procedure delineated for decision139
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making in Article 4 of the March Agreement does not specify in which circumstances a
supermajority is necessary to reach a decision. 147 Furthermore, the March Agreement
provides no directive as to how to proceed if a supermajority is not reached. 148 The
United States, looking to its own legal practices, has suggested that the result would be a
“hung jury” and there would be a retrial. 149 However, Cambodian law does not contain
the hung jury procedure. 150 Thus, this process risks a split decision between Cambodian
and international judges that could render the court incapable of reaching a decision and,
even worse, result in inappropriate acquittals. 151
¶32
The United Nations recognized the potential problems that could arise out of the
supermajority formula and repeatedly discussed the issue with Cambodia in an effort to
agree upon a solution. 152 Cambodia’s insistence on keeping the supermajority formula
vague could stem from its intent to leave itself a judicial loophole through which to
influence the Khmer Rouge trials.
V. THE SPECIAL COURT IN SIERRA LEONE
¶33

A tribunal fashioned after the Special Court seated in Sierra Leone may have been a
more effective accountability mechanism for bringing the Khmer Ro uge to justice than
the joint tribunal. The structure of Sierra Leone’s Special Court could potentially fulfill
several of the goals cited by supporters of the joint tribunal, while avoiding substantial
risks. The joint tribunal as it was created by the March Agreement places too heavy of a
burden on the underdeveloped Cambodian judiciary, which has long been manipulated by
the Cambodian Government.
¶34
Supporters of Cambodia’s joint tribunal envision that in addition to bringing justice
to the victims of the Khmer Rouge, the tribunal will create a legal framework for
Cambodian courts to follow in the future. Additionally, they hope that the effective
administration of justice through the joint tribunal will enable the Cambodian people to
witness the “first successful domestic operation of the rule of law” and begin developing
confidence in their judicial system. 153 Proponents of the joint tribunal also argue that the
insistence that the international community is the only entity capable of conducting the
trials of the Khmer Rouge is paternalistic and may be resented by the Cambodian
citizenry. 154 This argument is reinforced by the fact that the international community as a
whole remained silent for years with regard to Khmer Rouge accountability and provided
political support to the Khmer Rouge, which was allowed to occupy Cambodia’s seat at
the United Nations throughout the 1980s. 155
¶35
Unfortunately, the weakness of Cambodia’s judiciary combined with systematic
political corruption yields dim prospects for the success of the joint tribunal. However,
Cambodia need not have a purely international tribunal. The model provided by the
147
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Special Court would allow Cambodians to participate and have a stake in the Khmer
Rouge trials, while providing safeguards against governmental interference. The Special
Court in Sierra Leone is divided into one trial and one appellate chamber with the
possibility that a second trial chamber may be set up upon the request of the President of
the Court or the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 156 Article 2 of the Agreement
between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of
a Special Court called for Sierra Leone to appoint one judge to the trial chamber and two
judges to the appeals chamber and provided that the Secretary-General appoint the
remainder of the judges. 157
¶36
The format of the Special Court avoids the supermajority problem of the joint
tribunal because rulings are made on a majority basis and at least one international judge
must agree with the decision in order to make it stand. 158 This structure is, therefore,
more likely to yield consistent rulings. Furthermore, in the Special Court, the
international judges provide a safeguard against governmental interference. This would
not only facilitate the process of fair trials in Cambodia, but it would also give citizens
some assurance that the courts will work in an unbiased manner. Cambodian judges
while working alongside international counterparts could potentially experience trying
cases free of political coercion and interference for the first time in their careers.
VI. CONCLUSION
¶37

There is no ideal template for holding trials after gross human rights violations and,
thus, the selection of an appropriate accountability mechanism involves a complex
calculus of numerous factors. The primary goal of the Cambodian tribunal is to conduct
fair trials that will hold perpetrators responsible for their crimes and formally
acknowledge the wrongs committed against victims. In addition to this primary goal, the
tribunal may also be established in an effort to rehabilitate the country’s judicial system,
restore the citizenry’s confidence in its domestic judicial system and deter potential future
perpetrators. All of these goals must be considered in light of Cambodia’s political
stability and judicial system.
¶38
In the case of Cambodia, a country characterized by political corruption and a weak
judiciary, the trials of the Khmer Rouge will require a high level of international
guidance to shelter the trials from executive interference. The United Nations’ approval
of the March Agreement over the objections of Secretary-General Annan is surprising
due to its former insistence upon an international tribunal, the report of the Group of
Experts and Hun Sen’s obvious lack of good faith throughout the negotiations.
Furthermore, Hun Sen’s extreme conflict of interest in the trials due to his status as a
former Khmer Rouge member who could face prosecution if the tribunal were to expand
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its reach to low ranking officials, provides him with a strong incentive to interfere with
the trials.
¶39
Proponents of the joint tribunal, who argue that the trials will help Cambodia
establish a domestic legal framework, fail to recognize that the present judicial system is
too weak to undergo a massive rehabilitation without substantial international assistance.
The March Agreement does not provide adequate safeguards against the manipulation of
government officials interested in engineering the outcome of the Khmer Rouge trials.
Without a majority of international judges to ensure fair trials, the joint tribunal runs a
high risk of being ineffective at bringing justice to victims of the Khmer Rouge. If the
tribunal fails to achieve this primary goal, the secondary goals of rehabilitating the
judiciary and restoring confidence in the judicial system will not come to fruition.
¶40
A more prudent approach to the Cambodian trials would have been to create a court
similar to Sierra Leone’s Special Court. This alternative model may have resulted in a
beneficial balance of allowing Cambodian judges to participate in the Khmer Rouge trials
while a majority of international judges served as protectors of judicial independence. A
system resembling the Special Court possesses far fewer risks than the joint tribunal and
would have enhanced Cambodia’s prospects for achieving both the primary goal of
bringing the Khmer Rouge to justice and the secondary goal of creating a foundation for
a strong and independent judiciary in Cambodia.
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